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ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION 
AND PLACE OF MYTH IN PLATO: 
STATUS QUAESTIONIS
ABSTRACT: The paper raises the issue of allegorical interpretation, and its role and 
place in Plato’s philosophy. The first part of the paper shows the theoretical find­
ings and explains the use of terms ainigma, symbolon, hyponoia in Plato’s phi­
losophy. The next part explores Plato’s attitude toward allegorical interpretation 
and the function of myth (muthos) in his philosophy. Two important points are 
presented here regarding Plato’s critique. They serve as the criterion for the vali­
dation of myth in the ideal state: the role of myth in paideia and its relation to 
philosophical discourse.
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Ancient writers used Greek term allegorein (άλληγορειν)1 in the mean­
ings of both composing the text and interpreting it. The former is un­
derstood as conveying double meaning in writing. The latter is actually 
allegorical interpretation (allegoresis) and is understood as a read­
ing meanings of encoded in the text and explaining them. The reader
1 The term allegoria is derived from two Greek words alios “other” and agoreuo 
“to proclaim”, “to speak in public” and means literally “other-speaking”, “to speak 
otherwise” (Ferguson et al. 1999: 34; Copeland, Struck 2010: 2). This construction 
concerns two connected procedures: “a manner of composing and a method of inter­
preting” (Copeland, Struck 2010: 2; Domaradzki 2013: 19).
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presupposes that there is another sense which is hidden in the text by 
the author or a higher, spiritual authority.2 What is important is the fact 
that allegorical reading of the text blurred its literal meaning. Dawson 
notices: “Even when the allegorical reader does not explicitly reject the 
first meaning but simply adds the second to it, the mere presence of the 
addition implicitly denies the independence or exclusivity of the first 
meaning.”3 Contemporary scholars use the two different terms for the 
lucidity of language: “allegoresis” in the meaning of “interpretation” and 
“allegory” as a literary device.4
The term “allegory” is quite late, which is confirmed by Plutarch 
(1st/2nd century): while writing on the allegorical interpretation of poetry 
in De audiendis poetis (9e-9f), he states that what now is called “alle­
gory”, was called “hypónoia” in the past.5
In the dialogues of Plato it is difficult to point to one technical 
term used for allegoresis. It is well established that in Plato’s times the
2 Copeland, Struck 2010: 2.
3 Dawson 1992: 8. Pepin writes: “Encore faut-il, au prealable, s’entendre sur la 
notion meme d’allegorie, en la clarifiant par certaines distinctions. La premiere d’entre 
elles, fort elementaire et neanmoins indispensable (i), intervient entre I ’expression alle- 
gorique et l ’interprćtation allegorique, malheureusement confondues sous le meme vo­
cable d’« allegorie » (2). Au sens strict et etymologique, le mot designe une maniere 
de parler, un σχήμα λέξεως figure; au sens derive, qui finit par devenir le plus courant, 
il indique une faęon de comprendre la figure selon l ’intention de l ’auteur ; autrement 
dit, la premiere allegorie consiste a cacher un message sous le revetement d’une figure 
; la deuxieme, a decrypter la figure pour retrouver le message” (Pepin 1958: 487-488). 
For example M. Domaradzki (2013: 19-20); Dawson (1992: 4-5); Struck (2004: 2-3); 
Naddaf (2009: 111); Sijl (2010: 107) distinguish allegory from allegoresis. Domaradzki 
thinks that allegoresis should be distinguished from exegesis (Domaradzki 2011; Do­
maradzki 2013: 25-26) and etymology (Domaradzki 2013: 113-116).
4 The later term “allegory” was included among literary devices and “treated by 
turns as a genre, a mode, a technique, or a rhetorical device or trope, related to meta­
phor and sometimes defined as «extended (or continued) metaphor»”. This definition 
is found in Quintilian, Institutio oratoria VIII 6, 44 (Copeland, Struck 2010: 2). Do­
maradzki distinguishes two traditions: 1. rhetorical-grammatical tradition, in which 
allegory is understood as a rhetorical device and 2. hermeneutical tradition, in which 
allegory is a method of reading the hidden sense of communication and applies to cog­
nitive problems (Domaradzki 2013: 20). The history of term allegoria describes Daw­
son (Dawson 1992: 2-11).
5 De aud. poet. 19e-19f: ους ταις πάλαι μέν ύπονοίαις άλληγορίαις δέ νυν 
λεγομέναις (Hunter, Russell 2011: 100-101).
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method of allegorical interpretation was both well-known and com­
monly applied.6 However Plato uses other terms, writing on interpreta­
tion of myths or in relation to opinions, like αίνιγμα, σύμβολον, ύπόνοια 
(ainigma, symbolon, hyponoia) Later these terms were included within 
the meaning of the term “allegory” and allegorical readers used them 
interchangeably.
In Politeia Plato mentions the hidden meaning in the context of 
the interpretation of Homer’s poems, using the term ύπόνοια {Rep. II 
378d-378e).7 In Epistles Plato applies another term important for the 
allegorical interpretation, namely the notion of enigma (αίνιγμά). Be­
side the basic meaning of αίνιγμά which was “enigma”, “riddle”, 
“puzzle”, like for example The Riddle o f  the Sphinx or a hidden sense 
of an oracle, prediction or prophecy, the term was connected with 
the author’s intention to protect the truth taught.8 Plato uses the term 
αίνιγμά in all three meanings. First, in the Politeia he gives the example 
of a “children’s riddle (τω των παίδων άίνίγματι) about the eunuch and 
his hitting o f the bat” (Rep. 479c). Second, in the Apology Socrates states 
that Pythia is “propounding a riddle” (άίνίττεται) (Apol. 21b) and in 
the Charmides the inscription at the temple saying “Know yourself!” is 
characterized as “more riddling” (άίνιγματωδέστερον) (Charm. 164e). 
In the Symposium the language of an oracle is “darkly hinting” and the 
soul “only divining and darkly hinting what it wishes” (άλλα μαντεύεται 
ο βούλεται, και αινίττεται) {Sym. 192d). The enigmatic sense of an ut­
terance requires an appropriate interpretation, like in explaining the 
mysteries that had a hidden meaning. For example in the Phaedo (69c) 
those men who established the mysteries gave them a “hidden meaning”
The commonness of the practice is confirmed by the frequency of Plato’s refer­
ences to it in the fragments where it was necessary to show contradiction of someone’s 
views, ascribing enigmatic nature to them, for example: Apol. 27a; Charm. 162a; Thea. 
152c (Tate 1929: 143).
Rep. II 378d-378e: But Hera’s fetterings by her son and the hurling out of heaven 
of Hephaestus by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and 
the battles of gods in Homer’s verse are things that we must not admit into our city (ού 
παράδεκτέον έίς τήν πόλιν) either wrought in allegory or without allegory (ουτ’ έν 
ύπονοίαις πεποιημένας ούτε άνευ υπονοιών). For the young are not able to distinguish 
what is and what is not allegory... (ό γαρ νέος ούχ οίός τε κρίνειν ότι τε ύπόνοια και 
ο μη).
8 Domaradzki 2013: 31.
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(αίνίττεσθαι). The third and last sense is the “hidden meaning” of the 
poem. In his letter to Dionysius, the tyrant of Syracuse, Plato explains 
that he must explain “the doctrine concerning the nature of «the First»” 
(περί της του πρώτου φυσεως) to him in “a riddling way (δΤ αίνιγμών) 
in order that [...] the reader may not understand” (Ep. II 312d).9 In turn, 
Plato explains in Epistle VII that teaching directed to the tyrant was put 
in “veiled terms and maintained by argument” (αίνιττομενοι), but was 
not “expressed openly, for it would not have been safe” (Ep. 332d).10 The 
aim of enigmatic language was to shield true insights from the mob.
However, Plato very often uses the term αίνιγμα and speaking in 
ironic terms gives it the sense of aporia. According to Struck, the nature 
of enigma is that it “hides as much as it reveals and produces always 
two groups, the enlightened and unenlightened.”11 This is especially true 
of poetry, the interpretation of which may be questionable, for the poet 
may have used words meaning one thing with the intention of saying 
something else “for the sake of the machinery of the poem”12. Thus, in 
Politeia Plato shows that Polemarch’s references in discussion on justice 
to Simonides’s poetry are groundless, because the poet gave a riddling 
definition of justice. [ήινίξατο άρα, ήν δ ’ εγώ, ώς εοικεν, ο Σιμωνίδης 
ποιητικώς το δίκαιον ο είη] {Rep. I 332b).13 As is the case with Plato’s 
Politeia, so too in Lysis (214a-214e) and Alcibiades II  (147b-147d), this 
term is used with a similar meaning. In turn as part of the elenctic method 
of argumentation the term αίνιγμα occurs in Apology (27a), Theaetetus 
(152a-164d), Charmides (161d).14 Plato, showing the contradiction in 
someone’s stance, ironically summarizes it by saying that apparently
Ep. II312d-312e: φραστέονδή σοι δι’ αίνιγμών,ϊν’ αν τι ή δέλτος η πόντου η γης 
έν πτυχαις πάθη, ό άναγνους μή γνω.
10 Ep. VII 332d: λέγοντες ούκ έναργώς ούτως—ού γαρ ήν ασφαλές—αίνιττομενοι 
δέ καί διαμαχόμενοι τοις λόγοις...
11 Struck 2004: 49.
12 Tatian, ad Graec. 21,7: Και τον Έκτορα δέ και τον Άχιλλεα δηλαδή και τον 
Άγαμέμνονα πάντας απαξαπλώς 'Έλληνας τε και βαρβάρους σύν τη Έλενη τώ 
Πάριδι της αύτης φυσεως υπάρχοντας χάριν οίκονομίας Ερειτε παρεισηχθαι ούδενος 
οντος τών προειρημενών Ανθρώπων.
13 Ford 2002: 114; Domaradzki 2013: 32.
14 Domaradzki 2013: 33-34. In the Charmides Plato shows the ambiguity of the 
stance saying that “the speaker of the words did not mean them quite as he spoke them 
(οτι ού δηπου [...] η τα ρηματα Εφθεγξατο ταύτη και Ενοει -  Charm. 161d).
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the author in question had said “a puzzle” and spoken “enigmatically” 
(Apol. 27d: αίνίττεσθαι Charm. 162a: ήινίττετο; Theaet. 152c: ηνίξατο). 
According to Struck and Domaradzki, Plato was able to achieve “a sub­
tle cutting rhetorical position” in such constructions, because the prac­
tice of allegorical interpretation had already been widespread among his 
contemporaries.15 Irony undercuts both the speaker’s authority and that 
o f the interpreters, who seek hidden wisdom in such figures.
There was another concept related to the term αίνιγμα, namely the 
notion of symbol, συμβολον, adopted later for the sake of allegoresis.16 
The term συμβολον, derived from the verb συμβάλλειν (“to put to­
gether”), meant “one half of an object -  usually a piece of cloth, wood, 
or pottery -  that is deliberately split in two and then allocated to the par­
ties to an agreement.17 This original meaning of the term was associated 
with that of “a sign”, σημειον, in which the symbol serves to confirm or 
authenticate the agreement. The term grew out, by abstract nominaliza- 
tion, from a verbal form: “The symbol begins life as a concrete thing 
by which the action contained in the verb is performed.”18 This sense 
of συμβολον lies behind Plato’s famous comment on the nature of love 
in the Symposium (Sym. 191d, 3-5), where the lovers are shown as one 
original whole that was split into two halves which now search for each 
other.19 The symbol in the sense of “a sign” that serves to authenticate, 
occurs in Plato’s Epistle XIII. The introductory greetings serve as a sign 
o f authentication of the author of the letter: συμβολον οτι p a p ‘ Εμου 
Εστιν, as well as of the serious character of the letter: περι δέ δη του 
συμβόλου του περι τάς επιστολάς, όσας τε άν επιστέλλω σπουδή (Ερ. 
XIII 360a and 363b). Later, this meaning was adopted into political and
15 Struck 2004: 49-50; Domaradzki 2013: 34.
16 Until 300 BC this notion has nothing to do with figurative discourse. It was adop­
ted in the practice of allegoresis by the Greek stoic philosopher Chrysippus of Soloi, the 
foundation for what was prepared by the Pythagoreans. Chrysippus understood it as the 
“allegorical sense of the poem”, close to the notion of enigma (Domaradzki 2013: 41; 
Struck 2004: 78).
17 Struck 2004: 78; Domaradzki 2013: 43.
18 Struck 2004: 78.
19 Sym. 191d: έκαστος ούν ήμών έστιν ανθρώπου σύμβολον, ατε τετμημένος ώσπερ 
αί ψητται, έξ ενός δύο: ζητεί δή άει τό αύτοΰ έκαστος σύμβολον. [Then each of us is 
a symbol of a human, since we have been cleaved just like flatfish, two generated from 
one. So each person forever searches for the symbol of himself].
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business contexts, in which it acquired the most frequent sense in the 
surviving literature, i.e. that of an object used for “authenticating tokens 
for the two parties to an agreement.”20 Thus, on the one hand, σύμβολον 
has the nominal sense of “a sign, token”, and on the other, in legal usage, 
σύμβολα were covenants between two states, while the verb συμβάλλω 
meant “to make a contract or agreement.”21 In Politeia money is “a token 
for the purpose of exchange”, νόμισμα σύμβολον της Αλλαγής (Rep. 
371b). It is both a conventional and a natural sign, and in each case it 
requires bringing the inner sense of a message to light. All these senses 
are based on semantic ambiguity, on a play on which allegorical inter­
pretation depends: the literal sense and the inner one. This way all of 
them, myth, allegory, symbol, enigma, and metaphor make it possible to 
understand one thing through another, and serve to describe of true real­
ity, which defies natural perception by senses and direct description.22
1. THE PLACE OF ALLEGORICAL INTERPRETATION 
AND PLATO’S CRITIQUE OF POETRY
Allegorical interpretation is viewed by Plato as an uncertain method 
with respect to knowledge and as dangerous for children. Although he 
never denies the possibility of using it in a more philosophical way,23 
the use of allegory is questioned, because it cannot establish true knowl­
edge, as it is a device of poetic discourse having purposes different by 
nature. When arguing against someone else’s opinion, Plato makes refer­
ence -  often ironically -  to its enigmatic character, by pointing out and 
criticizing a contradiction in their statements.24 Also, the materials for 
allegorical interpretation25 were doubtful, because they were provided
20 Struck 2004: 79.
21 Domaradzki 2013: 44.
22 Domaradzki 2013: 78.
23 Struck 2004: 86.
24 Domaradzki 2013: 207-208.
25 Allegoresis aimed to save authorities of Greek paideia from the critique of ra­
tionalism. Historians questioned the cognitive value of poetry, while philosophers not 
only its cognitive value, but also its paideutical value (Domaradzki 2013: 91). “Behind 
this phenomenon there lies, as concerns pagan tradition, the strong conservatism of
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by the myths of Homer, Hesiod, and Orpheus. That is why, first of all, 
researchers estimated Plato’s attitude towards allegoresis basing their 
argumentation on his critique of poetry.26 According to Plato, from the 
metaphysical point of view, the nature of poetry is mimetic (μίμησις). It 
belongs to the realm of “imitation”, for a poetic discourse is a copy of 
reality to which it refers, i.e. objects and sensible occurrences. They are 
not truly real, but rather imitations of the truly real, i.e. copies of copies. 
“It is, therefore, «three removed from the truth».”27 Furthermore, this 
kind of poetic discourse functions within the relation “between a subject, 
the poet, and the object of which the poet is making a copy.”28 In this 
imitative discourse the subject disappears behind the enunciation, which 
becomes real. Poetry is very distant both “from the truth” (άληθείας)29 
and from the „mind” (φρόνησις). According Plato’s epistemology, the 
knowledge (ΕπιστΗμη) which is reliable (νόησις) is concerned only with 
archetypes (άρχαί), which belong to the sphere of Ideas. Poetry is con­
cerned with “images” (είδωλα), on which one can only form “opinions” 
(δόξα) and which are unverifiable (άλογον).30 “False discourse gives an 
unfaithful image of the reality which it claims to depict.”31 All the art is
Greek philosophical rationalism with its wish to preserve the whole tradition of pre- 
rational layers of the Greek mind” (Jaeger 1961: 47). There is also a positive kind of 
allegoresis that uses the poets’ authority for promoting some philosophical conceptions 
(Domaradzki 2013: 98); Tate it underlines: „Its purpose was not so much to defend the 
poetic traditions against charges of immorality as to make fully explicit the wealth of 
doctrine which ex hypothesi the myths contained” (Tate 1929: 142). Both these pur­
poses were connected with two names of the authors who began the practice of al­
legoresis. Theagenes of Rhegium (529/522 B.C.) and Pherecydes of Syros (the end of 
IV century B.C.).
26 Plato established the logos-mythos dichotomy by identifying muthos with false­
ness. On this opposition see e.g. Domaradzki (2013: 74); Naddaf, Translator’s intro­
duction, in: Brisson, Naddaf (1998: vii-xi); Narecki (1999: 17); Mrugalski (2006: 26).
27 Reale 1990: 132.
28 Brisson 2004: 18.
29 Tate states that the falsehood or truth of a mythis “not of the λόγος but of the 
moral, the mould (τύπος) in which the tale is cast, the principle (νόμος) which it em­
bodies, the opinion (δόξα) which it conveys. It is because of the false moral which they 
contain that Plato rejects the theomachies, the legends concerning Uranus, Cronus, and 
Zeus” (Tate 1929: 146).
30 Domaradzki 2013: 212.
31 Brisson 2004: 21.
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poles apart from the true philosophical knowledge; according to Plato, 
an opposition has existed from the old times between philosophy and 
poetry (ότι παλαιό μέν τις διαφορά φιλοσοφία τε καί ποιητικη) {Rep. 
607b). The poet appeals through the most excellent charm (μεγάλην 
τινα κήλησιν) {Rep. 601b) to the lowest part of the soul (έπιθυμία), “the 
part that craves food and drink and is a seat of sexual appetite,”32 one 
that is remote from intelligence and susceptible to manipulation. Poetry 
“destroys the rational part” of the soul (απόλλυσι το λογιστικόν) {Rep. 
605b). Myths are also deceitful in being aimed at children, because, “at 
that age, the appetitive part dominates the human soul,”33 The heavi­
est accusation concerns the poet’s power to corrupt (λωβασθαι) (Rep. 
605c) decent people. The poet is here a Sophist (Soph. 268c-268d), 
characterized by false discourse that “bears upon something other than 
it states,”34 Plato recognizes the poetry of the highest Greek authorities 
as “the greatest lie” (τό μέγιστον ψευδός) {Rep. 377e). Many myths that 
used to be transmitted orally from one generation to the next, regardless 
of how they were passed in collective memory, whether told by profes­
sionals, like Homer of Hesiod, or by nonprofessionals, like mothers, wet 
nurses, and old women, whose audience consisted mostly of children, 
should not have a place inpaideia (Rep. 377c-377d).35
Ή ρας δέ δεσμούς ύπο ύέος και Ηφαίστου ρίψεις ύπο πατρός, μέλλοντος 
τη μητρί τυπτομένη άμυνεΐν, και θεομαχίας όσας Όμηρος πεποίηκεν ού 
παραδεκτέον εις την πόλιν, ούτ’ έν ύπονοίαις πεποιημένας ούτε ανευ
32 Brisson 2004: 19.
33 Brisson 2004: 19.
34 Brisson 2004: 21.
35 Rep. 377e-378a: The greatest lie about the things of greatest concernment, 
(πρώτον μέν, ήν δ’ έγώ, το μέγιστον και περι των μεγίστων ψεύδος), which was no 
pretty invention (ό είπών ού καλώς έψεύσατο), of him who told how Uranus did what 
Hesiod says he did to Cronos, and how Cronos in turn took his revenge; and then there 
are the doings and sufferings of Cronos at the hands of his son. Even if they were true 
I should not think that they ought to be thus lightly told to thoughtless young persons. 
But the best way would be to bury them in silence (άλλα μάλιστα μέν σιγασθαι), and if 
there were some necessity for relating them, that only a very small audience should be 
admitted under pledge of secrecy (8i ‘ απορρήτων) and after sacrificing, not a pig, but 
some huge and unprocurable victim (θύσαμένους ού χοίρον Αλλά τι μέγα και άπορον 
θύμα), to the end that as few as possible should have heard these tales.
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ύπονοιών. ο γαρ νέος ούχ οίός τε κρίνειν ότι τε ύπόνοια και ο μή, [But 
Hera’s fetterings by her son and the hurling out of heaven of Hephaestus 
by his father when he was trying to save his mother from a beating, and 
the battles of gods in Homer’s verse are things that we must not ad­
mit into our city either wrought in allegory or without allegory. For 
the young are not able to distinguish what is and what is not allegory] 
(Rep. II 378d).
The majority of scholars interpreted this fragment as a direct critique 
of allegoresis.36 First, Plato does not decide here whether there is or not 
a deeper meaning latent in the myths, but it may be assumed that, while 
he accuses the poets of ignorance, virtually denying that “undersenses” 
are present.37 Second, every poetical fragment can be constructed in vari­
ous ways, so we cannot be certain, if the interpretation bears out what 
the author “meant” .38 According to Plato, the kind of myths like those of 
Homer or Hesiod should be kept out of the state. The influence of such 
myths is evil, and when offered to a young man, it is pedagogically use­
less and harmful, having negative influence in paideia. Moreover, they 
create a false image of the gods, as if the latter were full of violence and 
immorality. However, Plato seems to attach some value at least to some 
myths, distinguishing between true and false stories. (Αληθές, ψεύδος) 
(Rep. 376e).39 Plato often quotes myths to support his argument, for the 
poet’s words can be divinely inspired with right opinions (ορθή δόξα) 
(Meno 99), even though they cannot substantiate their intuitions and also 
we cannot be certain what is a correct interpretation.40 The first crite­
rion of measuring the value of a myth is paideia. Plato postulates that 
one should assume some patterns (τύποί), according to which myths
36 Domaradzki 2013: 208; Brisson, Naddaf 1998: 122; Ford 2002: 86; Most 2010: 
26; Brisson 2004: 27.
37 Tate 1929: 147.
38 Ford 2002: 86.
39 Rep. 376e: λόγων δέ διττόν είδος, τό μέν Αληθές, ψεύδος D‘ έτερον. Analogically
Plato writes in the Cratylus that there are two kinds of logos: true and false. When true
logos is divine, the false dwells among common men. Crat. 408c: έστι διπλούς, άληθης 
τε και ψευδης. Tate argues that poetry can deliver divine inspiration, like for example 
amessage of an oracle (Tate 1929: 147-149).
40 Tate 1929: 147.
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should be composed (Rep. 379a-381c). Censored myths (Εγκριθεντας) 
are capable of having a paideutical value and serving the soul’s forma­
tion (πλάττειν τάς ψυξάς αυτών τοις μυθοις). While being under the 
true logos, they can “point out” the way of life (άποδειξαι, σημαίνει) 
(Gor. 527b), “persuade” (πειθώμεθα) (Rep. 621c), give “the great hope” 
(ελπίς μεγάλη) (Fed. 114c) and convey the right ethical rules.41
2. THE PLACE OF MYTH AND THE FUNCTION OF 
KNOWLEDGE
Plato banishes the allegories of traditional tales of divine violence and 
immorality from the state, as we mentioned above, but at the same time, 
at crucial point in his dialogues, he introduces extended mythic narra­
tives of allegorical character. Plato makes use of myths to explain his 
most important but hidden teachings. These kind of myths seem to sup­
ply the philosophically correct teachings from which students will be 
able to learn.42 This apparent ambivalence could be explained based on 
a passage from Phaedrus which is a locus classicus based on which Pla­
to’s attitude to allegoresis is explained. Socrates answers here the ques­
tion, asked by his interlocutor, Phaedrus, whether he truly believes the 
story about Boreas’ rape of Oreithyia:
If I disbelieved, as the wise men do, I should not be extraordinary; then 
I might give a rational explanation, that a blast of Boreas, the north wind, 
pushed her off the neighboring rocks as she was playing with Pharmacea, 
and that when she had died in this manner she was said to have been 
carried off by Boreas. But I, Phaedrus, think such explanations are very 
pretty in general, but are the inventions of a very clever and laborious 
and not altogether enviable man, for no other reason than because after 
this he must explain [Επανορθουσθαι] the forms of the Centaurs, and 
then that of the Chimaera, and there presses in upon him a whole crowd 
of such creatures, Gorgons and Pegasuses, and multitudes of strange, in­
conceivable, portentous natures. If anyone disbelieves in these, and with
41 Domaradzki 2013: 223.
42 Most 2010: 26.
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a rustic sort of wisdom, undertakes to explain each in accordance with 
probability, he will need a great deal of leisure. But I have no leisure for 
them at all; and the reason, my friend, is this: I am not yet able, as the 
Delphic inscription has it, to know myself (Phaedr. 229c-239e).
Socrates repudiated the practice of correcting the old myths, showing 
its unfeasibility and unethical nature.43 First, it is impossible to explain 
every single mythological element of an allegory, without applying the 
explanatory procedure to the entire pantheon of Gods and mythological 
creatures. This causes difficulties, as there is always a wider context and 
many possible interpretations.44 Another reason for abandoning the idea 
of correcting the old myths is the irrelevance of this kind of knowledge, 
which entices us away from searching for ethical truth.45 Plato’s interest 
in myths is to break their monopoly, when myths serve pleasure. He ac­
cords a superior status to philosophical discourse. Finally, what happens 
if one accepts the hypothesis that some myths conceal the truth? Plato 
rejects this idea, since truth for him is the domain of the philosopher’s 
discourse.46 The truth value of a myth is always secondary to philosophi­
cal discourse (logos) and in condition of agreement with philosophical 
truth. False discourse conveys a message different from what it literally 
means and this is in fact allegorical interpretation. Such an interpretation 
which replaces false meanings with true ones is unacceptable for Plato.
Similar to the term ainigma in its polemical and pejorative senses, 
Plato uses the term muthos, μύθος ironically in criticizing someone 
else’s stance.47 The term μύθος carries this sense in the Theaetetus (Thea. 
164d-164e), where Protagoras’ teaching is characterized as a myth. Also 
in the Sophist (Soph. 242c-242d) the doctrines under discussion are 
called myths. All these philosophical doctrines are false and criticized 
by Plato.48
On the other hand, Plato uses the term μύθος in his own discourse 
when explaining very difficult philosophical issues.
43 Domaradzki 2013: 209.
44 Domaradzki 2013: 209; Brisson, Naddaf 1998: 127; Tate 1929: 151.
45 Ford 2002: 86.
46 Brisson, Naddaf 1998: 127.
47 Domaradzki 2013: 221.
48 Brisson, Naddaf 1998: 128-129; Domaradzki 2013: 221.
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The term eikds muthos, είκος μύθος refers to his cosmological pos­
tulates on the construction of the sensible world in the Timaeus (Tim. 
30b, 48d, 53d, 55d, 56a, 57d, 90e).49 This expression means: “«a myth 
which bears upon the copies of the intelligible forms», that is, sensible 
things.”50 It refers to “a discourse of what is made as a copy of that other 
[copy]” (τους δέ του προς μέν Εκείνο άπεικασθεντος), which therefore, 
is itself “a copy, standing to discourse of the former [philosophical] kind 
in proportion” (οντος δέ είκόνος είκότας άνά λόγον τε εκείνων όντας) 
(Tim. 29c). This kind of discourse, as a copy of the intelligible world, is 
sensible and falsifiable. “Only the present state of sensible things, which 
are copies of intelligible forms are susceptible of being perceived by 
the senses, and as being described by falsifiable discourse”, described as 
eikds logos51 In turn, eikds muthos can be presented only by an explana­
tory model, whereas the discourse is itself unfalsifiable with regard to 
sensible things (the object is inaccessible both to direct and indirect per­
ception, i.e. the senses and the intellect). On the contrary, philosophical 
discourse “bears upon the intelligible forms apprehended by the intellect. 
These intelligible forms, which constitute true reality, are immutable,”52 
and only a discourse concerning them is abiding and firm (μονίμου καί 
βεβαίου) (Tim. 29b), and also true. For the verification of a mythologi­
cal discourse it is necessary to relate it to a philosophical one: the myth 
is either true or false depending on whether it accords with philosophy 
on the same subject.53 To show the truth of a mythological discourse it 
must be showed how and to what extent it agrees with the philosophical 
paradigm. This is Plato’s second criterion for the validation of a myth.
49 Brisson, Naddaf 1998: 129. Brisson use here the expression “derivative sense”,
which refers to rhetorical or philosophical contexts (Brisson, Naddaf 1998: 128-133;
Brisson 2004: 21-28).
50 Brisson, Naddaf 1998: 130.
51 Brisson, Naddaf 1998: 130.
52 Brisson 2004: 22.
53 Brisson 2004: 27.
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CONCLUSIONS
Plato banishes myths from the state as well as their allegorical explana­
tion, because of the false paideia. According to Plato, paideia should be 
an expression of truth. Because this condition of verifiable discourse is 
not met, the poetical tales of Homer and Hesiod have no validity in the 
ideal state. However, another criterion Plato adopts is whether a myth 
agrees with the philosophical discourse or not. In this case, the dis­
course can be deemed verifiable only based on its adequacy to its ref­
erent. Moreover, the referent, which is either in the intelligible world 
or in sensible things, needs to be accessible either to the intellect or to 
the senses. This does not concern the mythical type of discourse, the 
referents of which are, by definition, inaccessible. Brisson concludes, 
that “myth should be situated beyond truth and falsehood; yet this does 
not seem to be the case since Plato presents myth at times as a false dis­
course and at times as a true one.”54 That is why in order to explain the 
exact place of mythical discourse in Plato one has to change the perspec­
tive. Truth and error of mythical discourse depend on its correspondence 
with another discourse, but not on the correspondence with its referent. 
The discourse becomes normative and epistemology gives way to cen­
sorship, not the thing, to which the discourse refers, whether it is the 
intelligible or sensible world. In the final analysis, the truth of a myth 
depends on its “conformity with the philosopher’s discourse on the intel­
ligible forms in which the individual entities that are the subjects of this 
myth participate.”55
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